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Column:
The Physics of Digital Information-Part 21
Fred Cohen
In part 1 of this series (Cohen, 2011a), we discussed some of the basics of
building a physics of digital information. Assuming, as we have, that science is
about causality and that a scientific theory should require that cause(C)
produces effect (E) via mechanism M (written C→ME), we explore that general
theory of digital systems from the perspective of attributing effects (i.e., traces
of activities in digital systems) to their causes. Full details of the current
version of this physics are available online2, and in this article, we explore a
few more of them.
Previous results questioning consensus around common definitions for the field
of digital forensics (Cohen, 2010) have led to additional study suggesting that
definitions presented before discussion lead to substantial consensus (Cohen,
2012). Thus each item discussed will start with a loose definition and example.
Definition: A unique history is a single C→ME chain that is the only consistent
path from the cause to the effect.
For example, suppose we have an imitative copy3 of an asserted electronic
message sent from one party to another. Given that trace and a set of claims
about the computers involved, a unique history would demonstrate that there is
one and only one party who could have produced the resulting trace, using one
and only one process, at one and only one time, from one and only one place.
Current state does not always imply unique history.
More generally there are two important rules that are almost always true for the
DFE examiner:
Given initial state and inputs, later outputs and states are known.
Given final state and output, inputs and prior states are not unique.
Digital systems have a finite number of states (settings of the digital values
across all of the stored values in the system). The mechanisms that manipulate
digital data are commonly called finite state machines or automata (FSM),
1
2
3

This editorial piece is extracted and modified from Cohen (2011c).
http://infophys.com/
Imitative copy := A reproduction of both the form and content of a record. This is what is
typically available and called an “exact”, “bit image”, or “forensically sound”, copy in digital
forensics. See Cohen (2011b).

7

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(1)
often detailed in terms of Moore machines (Moore, 1956) or Mealy machines
(Mealy, 1955). In such machines, current state and input lead to the next state
and output of the machine in a unique way. That is, given the initial state and
sequence of inputs, the final state and sequence of outputs are uniquely
determined. Thus time transforms the artifice as it moves forward. But in
digital forensics, we generally don't start with causes and try to predict effects.
Rather, we start with effects and seek to identify their causes. In modern
computers it is almost never possible to “run time backwards” given a set of
traces, and identify a unique history that led to the traces found.
Definition: Convergence asserts that, as a mechanism transforms inputs and
internal states into outputs and subsequent internal states over time, different
inputs produce identical outputs. Divergence asserts the opposite, that for the
same input, different outputs are detectable.
For example, if we test rolling a rock down a hill repeatedly and, no matter
how tightly we control the process, there are slightly different outcomes each
time, this would be divergence. But if we ran an FSM forward again and again
with different inputs and initial states each time, and got identical outputs and
final states, this would be convergence.
Digital space converges while physical space diverges with time.
The digital artifice over time is, in general, a many-to-one transform.
Furthermore, inverting time in an FSM produces potentially enormous class
sets of possible prior states and inputs, and determining them precisely is too
complex to be done for nontrivial systems (Backes, Kopf, & Rybalchenko,
2009). This is at odds with the current model of the natural world, in that
physical space is generally believed to have an essentially infinite number of
possible states and to increase in entropy over time so that order is always
reduced. No matter how tightly we control a physical experiment, there will
always be a level of granularity at which outputs are differentiable. The
difference between the digital and physical spaces is greatly influenced by the
fact that the digital space has only finite granularity in time and space, as was
discussed in the first article in this series.
Definition: Equivalent machines are, possibly different machines that, from an
external perspective, behave identically with respect to a defined set of external
data.
For example, different compilers may transform the same program into
different binary executable codes that work slightly differently even though
they produce the same outputs from the same inputs.
Many FSMs are equivalent.
An unlimited number of different FSMs may produce the same output
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sequence from the same or different input sequences. For example, at the level
of computer programs in common use, an editor, digital recorder, or user
program, may produce the same outputs from different inputs. With incomplete
traces, we cannot uniquely determine prior states and inputs. To the extent that
traces are more or less complete, we may or may not be able to uniquely
determine or bound the set of programs that might have produced the traces.
We may not even be able to determine the extent of completeness of traces we
have.
Definition: A lossy transform is a mapping from input to output that cannot be
reversed to produce a unique input. That is, it is a many to one transform.
For example, JPEG files are often compressed using the JPEG lossy
compression algorithm (Hamilton, 1992). The results trade off space for
quality.
Hash functions and digital signatures as lossy and thus not unique.
Any transform that produces output space of a predefined size for an input
space of a larger size is lossy and thus not unique. As an example, an MD5 or
SHA hash of a file does not uniquely identify that file. There are in fact an
unlimited number of other files that would produce that same hash value. Being
careful, note that this is not an infinite number of files – only an unlimited
number of them. To see this, suppose we generate file after file of length one
bit more than the length of the hash. Since the length is one bit more, there are
twice as many files of that length than there are hash values. If we create one
after another of these files, eventually we will exhaust all of the possible values
for the hash function, and as soon as we get to one more unique input file than
the number of possible hash value, we are guaranteed that two different input
files will have identical hash values. This does not make such hashes useless in
digital forensics, but it does mean that they do not uniquely identify an input or
certify that a produced file is unaltered from its initial creation.
A summary of properties
There are many other properties of digital systems and the physics of digital
information. A summary extracted from the book chapter identified above is
included here to expand thinking about these issues.
Digital World

Physical World

Finite time granularity (the clock)

Infinite time granularity

Finite space granularity (the bit)

Infinite space granularity
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Digital World

Physical World

Observation without alteration

No observation w/out alteration

Exact copies, original intact

No exact copy, original changed

Theft without direct loss

Theft produces direct loss

Finite (fast) rate of movement

No locality (entanglement)

An artifice created by people

A reality regardless of people

Finite State Machines (FSMs)

Physics and field equations

Homing sequences may exist

No perfect repeatability

Forward time perfect prediction

Forward time non-unique

Backward time non-unique

Backward time unique

Digital space converges in time

Physical space diverges in time

The results are always bits

The results are always continua

Results are always "Exact"

Results never perfectly known

Time is a partial ordering

Time is real(location)

Errors accumulate

Errors are local

Representation limits accuracy

Reality is what it is

Precision may exceed accuracy

Precision is potentially infinite

Forgery can be perfect

Forgery cannot be perfect

DFE is almost always latent

Some evidence is latent

DFE is trace but not transfer

Traces comes from transfers

DFE is circumstantial

Evidence is circumstantial

DFE is hearsay

Evidence is physical
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Digital World

Physical World

DFE cannot place a person at a place at Evidence may put an individual at a
a time
place at a time
DFE can show consistency or
inconsistency only

Evidence can show more than just
consistency

Probability is dubious

Probability is often usable

Content has information density

No defined density limits

Content density variable

Content density not controlled

Content perfectly compressible

No perfect compression

Digital signatures, fingerprints, etc.
generated from content

Body (phenome) generated from DNA
(genome)

Content meaning is dictated by context No universal theory of meaning but
physicality exists regardless
Context tends to be global and
dramatically changes meaning

Context tends to be local and
incrementally changes meaning

FSMs come to a conclusion

Eats shoots and leaves

Cognitive limits from program

Cognitive limits from physiology

Hardware fault models from computer Hardware fault models from physics
engineering
Time and space tradeoffs known

Tradeoffs unclear

Near perfect virtualization and
simulation possible

No virtualization

Many nearly or equivalent FSMs

The uncertainty principal

Undecidable problems

Nothing known as "unthinkable"

Computational complexity limits
computations

No well understood limits on new
ideas
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Digital World

Physical World

Everything is decidable

Many things are not decidable

Consistency is guaranteed

Consistency is possible

Completeness is guaranteed

Completeness is possible

Consistency AND completeness

Consistency OR completeness

Time limits on achievable results

Time limits unknown

Complexity-based designs

Complexity not determinant

Fault tolerance by design

Normally not fault tolerant

Accidental assumption violations

Assumptions non-violable

Intentional assumption violations

Assumptions non-violable

Discontinuous space

Continuous space

Discontinuous time

Continuous time

Minor differences amplified near
discontinuities

Differences retain fidelity

Major differences suppressed away
from discontinuities

Differences retain fidelity

Identical use of an interface may
produce different results

No such thing as identical, each thing
is unique

Ordering may be reversed

Ordering subject to light time

Value sorts may be reversed

Value sorts remain consistent

Actuate-sensors loop errors

Interference based errors

Sensors/actuators limited in physical
properties

All physical properties present

Table 1 – Summary of Information Physics
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A final comment
There is a lot to learn about the physics of digital information, and from the
perspective of digital forensics, this is the sort of knowledge that is
increasingly necessary to understanding what you are doing when you
undertake to testify about such matters.
I urge you to review the details of the physics in its full richness and with its
current limitations, and to draw your own conclusions. Read the chapter cited
above, comment on it, prove it is wrong if and where it is, show its limits, and
move the field forward.
And I urge you to challenge yourself and others to up your game. In case after
case, we encounter self-identified experts who don't understand the basics of
how things work and end up testifying with inadequate basis. In many cases
their conclusions may be right, but their presentation and the facts they provide
may not support them. In other cases, their conclusions are not right at all. At
the heart of it all is the lack of attention to the basics of the science that
underlies digital forensics. This is a problem we hope to continue to address in
this series and this publication.
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